Dyson v Dreame:The Unified Patent Court’s long-arm jurisdiction
by Mario Pozzi, Partner and Francesca Belloni, Trainee lawyer
In its decision of 7 April 2026 (Dyson v. Dreame, UPC_CFI_2255/2025), the Hamburg Local Division further refines and expands the boundaries of long-arm jurisdiction.
Overview of the decision
The case concerns the alleged infringement of a European patent relating to hair styling devices and involves a distribution chain spanning the EU and the UK. The claimant sought a preliminary injunction not only for UPC territories, but also for the Spanish and UK national parts of the patent.
The defendants span multiple jurisdictions: Dreame International (Defendant 1, Hong Kong), Dreame Technology AB (Defendant 2, Sweden), Dreame Technology Netherlands B.V. (Defendant 3, Netherlands), Teqphone GmbH (Defendant 4, Germany), and Cellcom Ltd. (Defendant 5, UK).
While the decision confirms a broad approach grounded in Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, it also highlights foreseeability as a meaningful limiting principle.
Spain: Universal Jurisdiction over a NON-UPCA Territory confirmed
Even though Spain is not a Contracting Member State of the UPCA, the Hamburg Local Division confirmed its jurisdiction over the Spanish national part of the patent in suit with respect to Defendant 1 and 3.
a) Jurisdiction over Defendant 3 (Dreame Netherlands) via Article 4 BR
Dreame Netherlands is the EU representative for Defendant 1 and acts as the importer of record for all shipments into the European Union, including Spain.
Under Article 4 Brussels I Recast Regulation (BR), any person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in the courts of that Member State. The UPC, following Article 71a BR, is treated as a common court of the Contracting Member States.
The UPC therefore has jurisdiction over Dreame Netherlands by virtue of its Dutch domicile alone, with no need to assess where the infringing acts occurred.
b) Jurisdiction over Defendant 1 (Dreame International) via Article 8(1) BR
Dreame International is domiciled in Hong Kong, not in any EU Member State. Article 4 BR therefore does not apply. The only available route to UPC jurisdiction is Article 8(1) BR, which allows a defendant to be sued before the court of a Member State where a co-defendant is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear them together in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments.
Article 71b (2) BR extends this provision for the UPC to persons not domiciled in an EU Member State.
With Dreame Netherlands established as an anchor defendant under Article 4 BR, the Court examines whether Dreame International may also be brought within its jurisdiction. The answer is affirmative: the close connection is established in the present case as both defendants are jointly active in the distribution of the infringing products in Spain, Dreame Netherlands as importer, Dreame International as operator of the Spanish online shops. They belong to the same group and pursue the same commercial objective.
The close connection required by Article 8(1) BR is therefore satisfied, and the risk of irreconcilable judgments if the claims were adjudicated separately is real.
The Local Division has issued the decision despite the pending referral by the UPC Court of Appeal to the CJEU (Order of 6 March 2026) concerning the interpretation of Article 8 BR and the question of whether an intermediary can function as an anchor defendant under Article 8.
The message is significant: where the anchor defendant is itself a direct infringer the UPC can derive its jurisdiction from over third-country defendants (Defendant 1) its universal jurisdiction against the direct infringer domiciled in one of the Member States (Defendant 3).
United Kingdom
The analysis concerning the jurisdiction over the UK national part of the patent produces a more complex outcome, that deserves close attention. The Court reaches different conclusions on jurisdiction and on the merits and draws a sharp distinction between Defendant 3 and Defendant 5.
Defendant 3 (Dreame Netherlands): Jurisdiction Accepted, Injunction Refused
Here too, it is helpful to start from what Dreame Netherlands actually does in relation to the UK. Dreame Netherlands is not the importer of Dreame products into the UK, that role belongs to Defendant 5. However, Dreame Netherlands acts as EU Authorised Representative under the General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR, 2023/988/EU) and the Market Surveillance Regulation (2019/1020/EU). These regulations require that non-EU-based manufacturers provide for an authorized representative in the EU.
On jurisdiction, the Court accepts competence over Dreame Netherlands for acts relating to the UK territory, again via Article 4 BR. The fact that Dreame Netherlands performs a regulated function in Northern Ireland is sufficient to justify the UPC hearing the question of whether an injunction under UK law could be granted against it.
On the merits, however, no injunction is issued. The Court reasons that the GPSR is applied in Northern Ireland for a specific and limited purpose: to facilitate dual market access and avoid a hard border with the Republic of Ireland. It is not designed to regulate commercial conduct on the UK market or to set product safety standards within the UK as such.
Acting as EU Authorised Representative in this context does not make Dreame Netherlands a joint tortfeasor or an intermediary under English patent law — particularly since the UK is no longer bound by the Enforcement Directive, which would otherwise provide the relevant framework. Dyson failed to demonstrate with sufficient certainty that English courts would treat a GPSR-mandated representative as liable in patent infringement proceedings.
Defendant 5 (Cellcom Ltd.): No Jurisdiction at all
The Hamburg Local Division firmly denied the UPC’s jurisdiction over Defendant 5 (Cellcom Ltd.) with respect to the alleged infringement of the UK national part of the patent. While the Court accepted that it had jurisdiction over Defendant 3 as an EU-based company under Article 4 BR, it rejected the argument that this could anchor jurisdiction over the UK distributor.
Drawing on the CJEU’s Painer judgment, the Court found that Article 8(1) BR requires that it be reasonably foreseeable for the co-defendant that it could be sued before the court of the anchor defendant’s domicile. A UK distributor operating exclusively on the UK market cannot reasonably foresee being drawn into UPC proceedings on the basis that a Dutch company performs a GPSR compliance function in Northern Ireland. That function exists solely to manage the regulatory consequences of the Irish border arrangements and creates no legally meaningful connection between Dreame Netherlands and Cellcom’s commercial activities.
As a result, extending jurisdiction over Defendant 5 would contravene the foreseeability requirement underlying Article 8(1) BR, which functions as an exception to the general rule of domicile-based jurisdiction.
The Court’s conclusion is clear: regulatory compliance roles cannot serve as a backdoor to extend UPC jurisdiction over defendants for whom the necessary foreseeability is absent.
Conclusions
Universal jurisdiction under Article 4 BR is now firmly established in UPC practice. Any defendant domiciled in a Contracting Member State can be sued before the UPC for acts committed anywhere, including in non-UPCA countries.
For patent holders, this means that a single set of UPC proceedings can deliver pan-European and even broader relief, provided at least one defendant with a sufficiently central role in the infringing conduct is domiciled within a Contracting Member State.
The anchor defendant mechanism under Article 8(1) BR amplifies this dynamic considerably. Once a domiciled defendant is in play, third-country companies can be drawn into the same proceedings if the factual and legal connections are sufficiently close. The present decision confirms, however, that the mechanism is at its most powerful when the anchor defendant is itself a direct infringer.
Foreseeability emerges from this decision as the true limiting principle of the co-defendant mechanism. Article 8(1) BR is not a general tool for consolidating all related defendants before a convenient forum. It operates within boundaries, and those boundaries are defined not merely by factual proximity or commercial connection, but by the reasonable expectations of the parties themselves. The Court’s refusal to extend jurisdiction to the UK distributor on the basis of a GPSR compliance role sends a clear signal: not every legal obligation that touches a territory will generate the kind of foreseeable jurisdictional exposure that Article 8(1) BR requires.